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Prisoner Voting and Rights Deliberation: 
How New Zealand's Parliament Failed 
ANDREW GEDDIS* 
The question whether individuals sentenced to terms of imprisonment 
should be able to vote has arisen periodically in New Zealand, as 
well as other liberal democracies. In 2010, Parliament voted to take 
the right to vote fro.m all se.ntenced prisoners. This decision was 
taken despite the Attorney-General indicating thC}t. the legislation 
",.~ 
imposes an unjustified limit on the right .to vote contained in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and against the international 
trend to enfranchise prisoners. As such, we should expect to see 
parliamentarians give careful attention to the rights consequences of 
their action. However, only the most cursory discussion of the right 
to vote took place during the process of enacting this legislation. This 
failure to engage properly with questions of individual rights means 
that .Parliament is falling short of its duty as sovereign lawmaker 
for New Zealand 
I Introduction 
In December last year, New Zealand's Parliament enacted the Electoral 
(Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010. This legis-
lation disqualifies from registering on the electoral roll all persons serving 
any sentence of imprisonment imposed after its passage, thereby preventing 
them from voting in general or local body elections whilst they remain 
incarcerated. Its entry onto the statute books raises obvious issues about the 
natUre of the vote and rationales for denying it to any group in society; issues 
th~t are somewhat gel1eric and have had to be addressed in every democracy. 
*Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago. My thanks to the two reviewers of this 
article. 
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Seen from this perspective, New Zealand's move to expand the number of 
prisoners deemed ineligible to vote is interesting mainly because it flies in 
the face of a general move in established liberal democracies' away from 
applying blanket disenfranchisement rules to serving prisoners. However, 
beyond the substantive content of this new law, the process by which it came 
to be passed also is worthy of note. In particular, a majority of Members of 
Parliament voted to enact the measure despite the Attorney-General advising 
them of his opinion that it was inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA).l The Select Committee scrutiny of the Bill 
was both cursory and deeply flawed, leading to a remarkable error whereby 
it recommended the House adopt an amendment that actually would have 
allowed all current prisoners to vote irrespective of their sentence, whilst 
disenfranchising every future prisoner. Finally, the debate during the Bill's 
final stages in the House was at best perfunctory, with the Government 
Members of Parliament (MPs) who voted to pass the Bill into law hardly 
bothering to provide any reasons for why they supported it. 
This rather cavalier attitude displayed towards the right to vote ofliter-
ally thousands2 of New Zealand citizens is indicative of a more general 
lack of legislative care exhibited by the nation's elected representatives. 
On a number of recent occasions, Members of Parliament have passed 
enactments that contain provisions limiting individual rights that do not 
appear to "be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".3 
Or, rather, if they consider that'the proposed limit on the relevant right 
can be justified, they repeatedly neglect to set out clearly their reasoning 
and explain why they believe the change to be so important. These events 
raise questions about New Zealand's present constitutional arrangements, 
in particular the complete lawmaking authority enjoyed by the legislative 
branch of government and the extremely weak influence that the NZBQRA 
has over that institution. Insofar as parliamentarians fail to take seriously 
their role as lawmakers and ultimate decision-makers over what individual 
rights mean, their claim to have final authority over the law is undermined. 
1 Christopher Finlayson Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 on the Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment 
Bill (14, published by Order of the .House of Representatives, 2010). 
2 As of 15 June 2010, there were 2,733 prisoners serving sentences ofless than three 
years who would have been disenfranchised if sentenced after the new blanket ban was 
enacted. A further 4,090 persons were already disenfranchised under the previous law 
as they are serving sentences of three years or more: see Department of Corrections 
Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill: Initial Briefing 
for the Law and Order Committee (2010) at 14 <www.parliament.nz>. 
3 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
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Part II outlines the history of prisoner voting in New Zealand to provide 
. context for the recent legislative decision to disenfranchise all serving 
prisoners. Part III examines substantive problems with this decision; in 
particular, its quite arbitrary and disproportionate consequences and the 
inconsistency between these outcomes and human rights norms. It then goes 
on to explore the deeper question of whether it is ever justifiable to remove 
the vote from any prisoners. Part IV turns to look at procedural issues with 
how the disenfranchisement legislation was enacted into law, especially 
the failure of those Members of Parliament who supported the measure to 
provide public justification for their position. This failure is then set in the 
broader context of how the New Zealand Parliament addresses legislation 
that it has been informed unjustifiably limits one of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed in the NZBORA. The article concludes with a warning about 
the impact that these shortcomings in legislative due process may have on 
Parliament's status as supreme lawmaker for New Zealand as a nation. 
n Prisoner Voting in New Zealand to the"'Present Day 
Prisoners' entitlement to vote is an issue that traces back to the first intro- ., 
duction of local representation into New Zealand.4 Along with all women 
and those men younger than 21 years or without sufficient property holdings, 
the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK) also excluded from the 
franchise those persons imprisoned for "any treason, felony, or infamous 
offence within any part of Her Majesty's dominions".5 While near~universal 
suffrage was achieved by 1893, when New Zealand extended the franchise 
to all adult women, prisoner disenfranchisement actually was widened in 
1905 to include any person convicted of an offence punishable by death 
or a term of imprisonment of one year or more.6 Fifty years later it was 
extended still further, with all "[p ]ersons detained pursuant to convictions in 
any penal institution" prohibited from registering on the electoral roll (and 
hence from casting a ballot at election time).7 This blanket ban on convicted 
prisoners voting whilst behind bars lasted until 1975, when it was repealed 
4 The history of prisoner disenfranchisement is discussed in Greg Robins "The Rights of 
Prisoners to Vote: A Review of Prisoner Disenfranchisement in New Zealand" (2006) 4 
NZJPIL 165 at 166-171. 
5 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (Imp) 15 & 16 Viet c 72, s 7. 
6 Electoral Act 1905, S 29(1). 
7 Electoral Act 1956, s 42(1)(b). 
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and aU prisoners were permitted to vote.s However, following a change of 
government at the 1975 election, the blanket ban was reinstated in 1977.9 
This state of affairs lasted until 1993, when New Zealand's e1ectorallaws 
were overhauled to accommodate the move to a mixed-member proportional 
(MMP) voting system. Whilst enacting these new electoral rules, Parliament 
also voted unanimously to relax the restriction on who may cast a ballot from 
behind bars. Consequently, s 80(1)(d) of the Electoral Act 1993 disqualified 
from enrolling to vote, and hence from casting a ballot, only: 
A person who, under-
(i) A sentence of imprisomnent for life; or 
(ii) A sentence of preventive detention; or 
(iii) A sentence of imprisonment for a term of 3 years or more,-
is being detained in a penal institution[.] 
This new three-year-or-more threshold reflected the advice of the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System,IO which addressed the issue of 
prisoner voting alongside the broader question of which voting system 
New Zealand should adopt. It concluded that while the existing blanket 
prisoner disqualification rule could not be justified, 1I disenfranchising those 
guilty of particularly serious criminal offences was acceptable. Therefore, 
it recommended that only prisoners currently serving sentences of three 
years or more be denied the vote; to mirror an already existing rule that New 
Zealand citizens who remain outside the country for this period of time forfeit 
their right to vote until they return to the country. 12 When the new legislative 
framework for MMP was being drawn up in 1992, the Solicitor-General 
affirmed the Commission's recommendation on the basis that it would help 
to limit the arbitrary application of the disenfranchisement provision by 
restricting its effect only to serious criminal offending. 13 Consequently, the 
Solicitor;..General advised that s 80(1)(d) would represent a demonstrably 
justified limit on the right to vote recently guaranteed by s 12(a) of the 
NZBORA. 
8 Electoral Amendment Act 1975, s 18(2). 
9 Electoral Amendment Act 1977, s 5. 
10 John Wallace and others "Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: 
' Towards a Better Democracy'" (1986-1987] IX AJHR H3. 
11 Ibid, at[9.18]- [9.20]. 
12 Ibid, at [9.21] and recommendation 42. See also Electoral Act 1993, s 80(1)(a). 
13 Letter from JJ McGrath, Solicitor-General, to the Secretary for Justice "Opinion on 
consistency between NZ Bill of Rights Act and restrictions on prisoners ' voting rights" 
(17 November 1992) at [26] <www.crownlaw.govt.nz>. This advice is discussed in 
Robins, above n 4, at 170-171. 
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The three-year..,or--more disqualification rule quietly operated for some 
17 years without attracting any particular comment before a backbench 
Member of Parliament from the governing National Party, Paul Quinn, felt 
the need to propose a Member 's Bill on the topic. Any Memberwho does not 
also hold a ministerial warrant can seek to place such Bills before the House 
of Representatives. However, the number of such Bills that the House may 
consider is limited. 14 When a Member's Bill is removed from the order paper 
either by passage through the House or being voted down, its replacement 
is found by the random drawing oflots. Hence, the House came to consider 
Mr QUinn's Bill through fortune alone; his number just happened to be the 
one pulled from out of the hat. 
Mr Quinn's proposal was quite simple. It sought to return the law to its 
pre-1993 state by changing s 80(1)(d) from disqualifying those prisoners 
serving a sentence of three years or more to those serving any term of 
imprisonment. In support of this move, Mr Quinn claimed that the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System simply had got it wrong when it 
recommended only "serious offenders" senteqged 1.0 ,significant terms of 
imprisonment ought to be disenfranchised. Instead, he claimed that anyone 
who ended up in prison had thereby demonstrated such contempt for societal 
norms that they did not deserve the right to vote:15 
.. . we are talking about people who have transgressed against society. 
They have abused the rights that the community values and that the people 
who fought in the wars commemorated by the memorials in this Chamber 
fought to defend ... ' I believe that the community has the right to decide 
when it will no longer provide the protection that it offers when it protects 
people's right to vote. 
With the support of Mr Quinn's National Party colleagues and their ACT 
Party allies in government,the Bill received enough votes to pass into law. 
This article turns to consider first whether it should have done so, and then 
the process by which it was enacted. 
III Prohibiting all Prisoners from Voting: Substantive Problems 
The passage of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) 
Amendment Act 2010 means that any person who is detained in a prison 
under a sentence of imprisonment handed down after 16 December 2010 
14 Only six Member 's Bills can appear on the House's order paper for first reading at any 
time, 
IS (21 April 2010) 662 NZPD 10350-lO351. 
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(along with any prisoner already disqualified under the previous law) will be 
unable to vote as long as they remain behind bars. However, this apparently 
simple policy objective is achieved by a more complex means. The actual 
effect ofthe new s 80(1)( d) is to disqualify sentenced prisoners from having 
their name included on the electoral roll whilst they remain incarcerated. 16 
Therefore, the registrar of electors must remove from the roll the name of 
any already enrolled sentenced prisoner,!7 while any prisoner not enrolled 
will be prevented from doing so while in prison. 18 This means of achieving 
the desired legislative end of stopping prisoners from voting has potential 
flow-on consequences once a prisoner leaves prison, as he or she will need to 
take the positive step of re-enrolling before regaining the right to vote. Given 
that prisoners predominantly come from social groups that are very hard to 
enrol even once,19 it is foreseeable that a significant number will not do so 
again and thus effectively remain disenfranchised. Admittedly, the majority 
of the House's Law and Order Committee recognised this possibility in its 
report on the Bill, noting:20 
The Electoral Enrolment Centre has proposed working with the Department 
of Corrections to develop a national procedure to encourage prisoners to 
re-enrol upon release from prison. We are pleased that this proposal has 
the support of the department and expect the introduction of are-enrolment 
procedure in due course. 
Whether such a programme is developed, and how effective it will prove in 
practice, is yet to be seen. 
A second practical point of note is that prisoners will be removed from 
the electoral roll only after they are sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
Prisoners remanded to custody, whether before or after their trial, remain 
eligible to vote. Thus a person convicted of murder who is in jail on election 
day awaiting an inevitable sentence of imprisonment still will be able to cast 
a ballot, while a person sentenced the day before the election to a week's 
16 Only validly enrolled electors are eligible to cast a ballot at election time: Electoral Act 
1993, s 60. 
17 Ibid, s 98(1 )(f). 
18 Ibid, s 87(1). 
19 In particular, Maori are heavily overrepresented in the prison population. Despite making 
up only some 12.5 per cent of the general adult population, some 50 per cent of prison 
inmates are of Maori descent: see Department of Corrections Over-representation 
of Maori in the criminal justice system: An exploratory report (2007) at 6 <www. 
corrections.govt.DZ>. 
20 Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill 201 0 (117 -2) (select 
committee report) at 3. 
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imprisonment for breach of driving licence conditions will not be able to 
vote?1 The fact that disenfranchisement depends purely on whether a person 
happens to be serving a prison sentence on a particular date will result in 
further arbitrary outcomes. A recidivist burglar who receives a 30-month 
term of imprisonment the week after a general election will almost certainly 
be released in time to re-enrol to vote for the next election, even if she or he 
serves the sentence in full. However, a first-time burglar sentenced to just 
one month in jail the week before an election will not be able to vote in it. 
The nature of sentencing also exacerbates the arbitrary consequences 
of the blanket disqualification provision. A judicial decision to sentence 
a person to a term of imprisonment depends upon a number of factors 
other than the seriousness of the offending and the offender's past criminal 
record. It also takes into account matters such as the ability to make financial 
reparation for the offence, the support structures that an offender has 
around him or her, and whether these permit a less restrictive sentencing 
outcome than imprisonment.22 In particular, persons who otherwise would 
be sentenced to a short period of imprisonm~pt (i~ less than two years) 
may instead receive a term of home detention,23 provided that the court is 
satisfied there is a suitable place available ill which the offender can serve 
the sentence. Therefore, two offenders who commit the same crime may be 
given differing sentences depending on whether they own a house or have 
supportive family connections. The one with these things may receive a 
period of home detention, thus retaining her or his right to vote, while the 
one without may be imprisoned, thus losing it. 
A Inconsistency with human rights norms 
The arbitrary consequences of applying a blanket disenfranchisement rule 
to individual prisoners was the primary reason why the Attorney-General 
informed the House of his opinion that the original Electoral (Disqualification 
of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill 201024 was inconsistent with the 
21 As of 15 June 2010, some 219 persons were serving prison sentences ofless than three 
years for offences relating to driver licence and conduct: see Department of Corrections 
Electoral (Disqualification o/Convicted Prisoners) Amendment BilL' Initial Briefing/or 
the Law and Order Committee, above n 2. 
22 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8(g). 
23 Ibid, s 15A(1). 
24 The title of the Bill as introduced to the House differs from that of the finally enacted 
legislation. 
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NZBQRA.25 The Attorney-General noted that on its face a blanket ban on 
prisoner voting limits the right to vote guaranteed to all adult New Zealand 
citizens by s 12(a), which consequently requires justification under s 5. 
Whilst "assum[ing], without expressing an opinion, that temporarily 
disenfranchising serious offenders as a part of their punishment would be 
a significant and important objective" . that may justify preventing some 
prisoners from voting,26 the blanket disenfranchisement of all sentenced 
prisoners cannot meet that justificatory test. In particular:27 
The disenfranchising provisions of this Bill will depend entirely on the 
date of sentencing, which bears no relationship either to the objective of 
the Bill or to the conduct of the prisoners whose voting rights are taken 
away. The irrational effects of the Bill also cause it to be disproportionate 
to its objective. 
The Attorney-General's conclusion echoes the views of the highest courts 
in Canada,28 South Africa,29 Hong Kong30and Ireland,31 each of which have 
struck down under the irrelevant constitutional instruments laws that disen-
franchise all prisoners. The Australian High Court also has concluded that 
the blanket disenfranchisement of prisoners is inconsistent with the text 
and structure of the Australian Constitution;32 in particular the requirement 
that Parliament be "directly chosen by the people".33 Similarly, the 
European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the United Kingdom's 
blanket disenfranchisement of prisoners is incompatible with the right 
to regular, free and fair elections contained in art 3 of the First Protocol 
of the European Convention on Human RightS. 34 Admittedly, the United 
25 Under s 7 of the NZBORA, the Attorney-General is required to: 
. .. bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any prOVision in [a] Bill 
that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights. 
26 Finlayson, above n 1, at[ll]. 
27 Ibid, at [15]. 
28 Sauvev Canada (Attorney Generalj (1992) 7 OR (3d) 48 I (CA); aff'd [1993]2 SCR 438. 
29 August vBlectoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v National 
Institutefor CrimePrevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 
280 (CC). 
30 Chan Kin Sum v Secretary for Justice [2009] 2 HKLRD 166 (CFI). 
31 Breathnach v Ireland [200 I] 3 IR 230 (SC). 
32 Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43 , (2007) 233 CLR 162. 
33 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) 63 & 64 Vict c 12, ss 7 and 24. 
34 Hirst v The United Kingdom (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
See also Greens and MT v The United Kingdom (60041108 and 60054/08) Section 
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Kingdom's Parliament so far hC,ls refused to change the law in response to 
this ruling, and the House of Commons has even passed a motion supporting 
the continuation of the present ban.35 However, it is unclear how much of 
this resistance is due to a genuine assessment that banning all prisoners 
from voting is a legitimate and desirable policy to pursue, and how much 
is the result of growing political disquiet at the role the Convention and 
European Court are playing in domestic policy.36 Furthermore, such domestic 
resistance likely will prove futile. The European Court's Grand Chamber 
has rejected the United Kingdom's final appeal against its judgment and 
given that country six months to change its law to be consistent with the 
Convention,37 in keeping with the Court's consistent favouring of the right 
of prisoners to vote.3& Refusing to change domestic law to accord with the 
European Court's judgment on this matter then opens the United Kingdom 
to damages claims by individual prisoners, which could amount to hundreds 
of millions of pounds. 39 
Consequently, New Zealand's move from a somewhat targeted disen-
franchisement regime (ie only removing the rigbJ to v:ote from those serving 
three or more years behind bars) to the blanket disenfranchisement of all 
sentenced prisoners puts the country at odds With how the right to vote 
is understood and applied by the great majority of nations with which: it 
usually compares its human rights record. It also means that New Zealand 
likely has acted in breach of its commitments under art 2S(b) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.40 While the United 
IV, ECHR 23 November 2010. For criticism of the Court's decision on this point, see 
John Finnis "Introduction" in Johll Finnis Human Rights and Common Good: Collected 
Essays Volume III (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 44-45. 
35 (10 February 2011) GBPD HC 493. The recent debate over prisoner voting in the 
United Kingdom is outlined in Vaughne Miller and Isobel White Prisoners ' voting rights 
(SN01764 House of Commons Library 2011) <www.parliament.uk>. 
36 See Patrick Wintour "Lib Dems thwart Tory hopes of human rights convention 
withdrawal" The Guardian (United Kingdom, 14 March 20 11 ) <www.guardian.co.uk>. 
37 See Ben Quinn "Prisoners' voting rightS: government loses final appeal in European 
court" The Guardian (United Kingdom, 12 April 2011) <www.guardian.co.uk:>. 
38 See Frodl v Austria (2011) 52 EHRR 5 (Section I, ECHR); Scoppola v Italy (No 3) 
(126/05) Section II, ECHR 18 January 201l. 
39 Miller and White, aboven35, at 15- 17. 
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for signature 19 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976), art 25(b). This.reads: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article :2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors[.] 
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Nations' Human Rights Committee accepts that a criminal conviction may 
provide grounds for removing an individual's right to vote, it states: "The 
grounds for such deprivation should be objective and reasonable."41 In 
light of the Attorney-General's conclusion about the arbitrary impact of 
blanket disenfranchisement, it is difficult to see how simply serving a prison 
sentence on the date of an election can be a "reasonable ground" for denying 
an individual's right to vote. 
Inconsistency with human rights norms does not affect the legal validity 
of the disenfranchisement provision. Even if Parliament's blanket ban on 
sentenced prisoners enrolling to vote constitutes an unjustified limit on the 
NZBORA, s 12(a) guarantee of the right to vote, it is clear in its intent and so 
must be applied by the courts under s 4 of that legislation. The most a New 
Zealand court might possibly do in response to such an unjustified limit is 
issue a formal declaration of its existence, with even the availability of this 
remedy open to doubt.42 Furthermore, such a remedy is of debatable value in 
the present circumstances, given that a majority ofMPs quite happily voted 
for the legislation in spite of receiving numerous warnings that it imposed 
an unjustified limit on the right to vote. Whether adding a judicial voice to 
this chorus would do anything to change their minds is open to doubt. In a 
similar fashion, the fact that the United Nations' Human Rights Committee 
might at some future point censure New Zealand for derogating from its 
commitments under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights represents at most a potential political embarrassment. While the 
Government likely would prefer not to face such censure, the domestic 
political benefit gained from appearing to be "tough on criminals" may well 
outweigh the cost associated with receiving it. 
B Is prisoner disenfranchisement ever justified? 
The fundamental problem with prohibiting all serving prisoners from voting 
is that it is both under- and over-inclusive, given its intended purpose. The 
measure's intent is to mark society's disapproval of "the worst" criminal 
offenders through denying them the opportunity to participate in the 
41 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in 
public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25) 
(CCPRJC/21IRevIlAdd7, General Comment No 25 (General Comments) Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 1996) at [14]. 
42 See Claudia GeiJinger "On a Road to Nowhere: Implied Declarations of Inconsistency 
and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" (2009) 40 VUWLR 613. 
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communal practice of choosing the nation's lawmakers.43 However, some 
persons found guilty of quite serious criminal offences will not be affected by 
this measure at all, if their time in prison happens to fall between elections. 
Conversely, any prisoner unlucky enough to be serving a short prison sen-
tence on election day for relatively minor offending will be prohibited from 
voting. This lack of a rational connection between the basic objective of 
disenfranchising prisoners and the use of a blanket means to pursue it, along 
with the disproportionate impact it will have on some prisoners' rights, lies 
behind the near universal rejection of the policy by those courts that have 
examined it from a human rights perspective. However, what of the basic 
intent behind prisoner disenfranchisement itself? Is it ever justifiable to 
remove the right to vote from a11)l group of prisoners, no matter what their 
crime? 
As has been noted above, some form of prisoner disenfranchisement has 
been the norm in New Zealand since 1852, aside from a brief period between 
1975-1977. The Royal Commission on the Electoral System expressed:44 
. .. some sympathy with the view, which we think is widely held, that 
punishment for a serious crime against the community may properly 
involve a further forfeiture of some rights such as the right to vote. 
This sentiment was endorsed by the Solicitor-General in 1992.45 In his 
report on the original Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) 
Amendment Bill 2010, the Attorney-General also "assume[d], without 
expressing an opinion, that temporarily disenfranchising serious offenders 
as a part of their punishment would be a significant and important objective" 
that may justify stopping some prisoners from casting a ballot. 46 So the belief 
that at least some forms of criminal offending warrant the loss of voting 
rights has significant historical resonance in New Zealand. That past practice 
would weigh heavily against any move to extend the vote to all of New 
Zealand's prison population, making the full enfranchisement of prisoners 
an unlikely development in the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, disenfranchising any individual purely because of her or 
his criminal offending still requires justification. Excluding any person, or 
group of persons, from voting is in tension with the basic structure of New 
Zealand's electoral law. As previously noted, the NZBORA guarantees all 
New Zealand citizens aged 18 and over ''the right to vote in genuine periodic 
43 Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill 2010 (117-1) 
(explanatory note). 
44 Wallace and others, above n 10, at [9.21]. 
45 McGrath, above n 13, at [19H20]. 
46 Finlayson, above n I, at [11]. 
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elections of members of the House of Representatives, which elections shall 
be by equal suffrage and secret ballot";47 a right that the State should only 
limit where ~'demonstrably justified in a free and democratic sodety".48 The 
Electoral Act 1993 then confers a legal right to register to vote (and thus 
to cast a ballot) on all citizens and permanent residents who have lived for 
at least one year continuously in the country;49 indeed, such persons have a 
legal duty to place their names on the electoral roll (although not to actually 
cast a ballot).50 This right/duty is then removed from some persons on the 
basis that they lack the capacity to know their own best interests - that is, 
age5! - .- or because they have lost connection with the issues faced by New 
Zealand society due to an extended absence overseas. 52 Although prisoners 
do not comfortably fit into either of these categories, academic commentaries 
have identified at least two other possible reasons for removing their right 
to vote.53 First, it constitutes a form of punishment that piggybacks on the 
general loss of liberty associated with imprisonment. Second, it marks out 
the prisoner as having breached the social contract with the rest of society. 
The first claim, that disenfranchisement is just another form of punishment 
for committing a crime,54 treats the removal of an individual's fundamental 
rights and freedoms as a convenient retributive tool. Of course, a sentence 
47 New Zealand Bill of RightS Act 1990, s 12(a). 
48 Ibid, s 5. 
49 Electoral Act 1993, s 74(1). 
50 Ibid, s 82(1). 
51 Ibid, ss 3(1); definition of "adult" and 74(1). 
52 Ibid, s 80(1)(a)-(b). This ground of disqualification has been criticised by Sarah 
McClelland "The right to vote: Implications of New Zealand's International Legal 
Obligations and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" (1996) 26 Vl1WLR 575 
at 588. 
53 See Graeme Orr "Ballotless and Behind Bars: The Denial of the Franchise to Prisoners" 
(1998) 26 F L Rev 55; Richard L Lippke "The Disenfranchisement ofF elons" (2001) 20 
Law and Philosophy 553; Heather Lardy"Prisoner Disenfranchisement: Constitutional 
Rights and Wrongs" [2002] PL 524; Robins, above .n 4; Alec C Ewald and Brandon 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an international Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009). 
54 See, for example, the remarks of David Garrett MP during the Bill's first reading debate 
at (21 April 2010) 662 NZPD 10342: 
Although this is a member's bill, in my view it is part of a sea change that this 
Government has embarked upon in the law and orderfield.Along with measures to 
combat drug abuse and the other drivers of crime, the National-ACT Government 
is making it very clear that prison ought to be a place that people do not want to 
return to. Although it is incorrect to say our prisons are five-star hotels- I have 
visited seven or eight of them, and I know that is not the case-neither are they . 
hellholes or particularly unpleasant. That is changing. 
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of imprisonment is intended to sanction individuals for the wrongs they 
have committed whilst also protecting the community from their actions 
during their incarceration. And the very nature of prison itself involves the 
deprivation of a basic human right - the prisoner's freedom of movement. 55 
The administrative requirements of the prison regime may also entail 
additional limits on prisoners' individual freedoms: those of expression,56 
or peaceful assembly,57 or association.58 But it is then another step to strip 
a person of rights unrelated to the basic conditions of imprisonment, such 
as the right to vote, in order to impose an additional form of punishment. 
Simply put, would we contemplate punishing prisoners by taking away their 
right to manifest their religion,59 or to speak their native language,60 or to be 
free from medical experimentation61 whilst they remain incarcerated; and 
ifnot, why is it legitimate to seek tofurther punish them by removing their 
right to vote? 
Explaining why this last right is regarded as fair game from a punitive 
perspective in a way that other individual rights are not leads to the second 
argument: that losing the right to vote is a valid response to a criminal's 
breach of the social contract. 62 This claim treats voting as a relational right, 
different in its nature from other purely individual rights that prisoriers 
continue to possess whilst incarcerated. In other words, a person's right 
to take part in deciding collectively how society will be run depends upon 
her or his preparedness to accept and live by the rules society communally 
lays down through the criminal law. Should an individual step outside those 
rules by committing a crime that is serious enough to justify imprisonment, 
especially imprisonment for a protracted period of time, then that individual 
55 NZBORA 1990, s i8. 
56 Ibid, s 14. 
57 Ibid, s 16. 
58 Ibid, s 17. 
S9 Ibid, siS. 
60 Ibid, s 20. 
61 Ibid, s 10. 
62 See, for example, the comments of Simon Bridges MP during the Bill's first reading 
debate at (21 April 2010) 662 NZPD 10347: 
But with all rights, even with fundamental ones, go responsibilities. Ifwe like, we 
can put it this way: there is a social contract between individuals and the State. The 
S1;lte makes the r:ules. It compulsorily takes taxes and does all manner of things. In 
return, we receive all sorts of things: wann shelter sometimes; hospitals, schools, 
and of course the power of the ballot to elect or "unelect", and, in our privileged 
case in this House, to be elected. Prisoners, however, have opted out of that social 
contract. They have not gone just against the State's and society's basic rules, 
they have gone against the big ones, which means that incarceration has resulted. 
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has renounced through her or his own actions any claim to be allowed to 
take part in society's collective decisions. 
An immediate problem with invoking a contractual underpinning 
to the right to vote is deciding just how serious a breach of this putative 
social contract must be to warrant removing that right. After all, no one 
would argue seriously that receiving a parking ticket should be grounds 
for disenfranchisement, even though it transgresses against society's rules. 
However, any cut-off point above the trivial will result in a degree of arbi-
trariness. The problems with imposing a blanket disenfranchisement on 
all offenders sentenced to prison already have been discussed. Trying to 
distinguish between "serious" offenders and "not-so-serious" offenders in 
prison at election time then creates its own set of issues. Recall that New 
Zealand's previous three-years-or-more threshold was based on the Royal 
Commission's recommendation, which in turn simply picked up an already 
existing rule applying to New Zealand citizens who remain continuously 
outside the country rather than reflecting any careful analysis of the sorts of 
offending that attract this level of sentence. Furthermore, the "seriousness" 
of any given offence and thus the sentence it attracts may have little to do 
with an individual's general attitude towards society and its rules. Pure luck 
will determine whether punching an opponent in a drunken brawl is an 
assault that warrants at the very most a short term of imprisonment, or an 
act of manslaughter that lands the perpetrator in jail for several years. Yet 
the underlying action, and the perpetrator's basic attitude toward ''the social 
contract", is exactly the same. 
Beyond the question of just when a criminal action so violates some 
putative social contract that it justifies the forfeiture of an individual's right 
to vote lie deeper disputes over penal policy. In particular, is it wise to treat 
prisoners, or some set thereof, as being completely outside that contract whilst 
they are in jail and then expect them to rejoin society upon their release? 
Should society not instead seek to reconnect these disaffected individuals 
with their community and obligations thereto, rather than relegate them to 
the ranks of the civil dead? Such questions lead into hotly contested terrain. 
Suffice to say that there is a real tension between the goal of rehabilitating 
offenders and the desire for harsher retributive measures currently ascendant 
in the political realm.63 Furthetmore, there is no one unarguably correct way 
to resolve that tension, given the existence of various viewpoints on how 
63 See Mark Brown and Warren Young "Recent Trends in Sentencing and Penal Policy in 
New Zealand" (2000) 10 International Criminal Justice Review 1; Julian V Roberts and 
Michael J Hough Understanding public attitudes to criminal justice (Open University 
Press, New York, 2005) at 16-18; John Pratt and Marie Clark "Penal populism in New 
Zealand" (2005) 7 Punishment and Society 303. 
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society ought to respond to criminal offending.64 For example, s 7 of New 
. Zealand's Sentencing Act 2002 states that the purposes for which a court 
may sentence an offender not only include holding the offender accountable 
for the harm they have caused65 and denouncing his or her conduct,66 but also 
"to assist in the offender's rehabilitation and reintegration",67 
The question of whether the basic purposes of imprisonment are served 
by denying any class of prisoner the right to vote has provoked as much 
disagreement in the judicial realm as the overtly political. Indeed, it split the 
Supreme Court of Canada five-to-four, with a bare majority striking down 
a ban on prisoners serving sentences of more than two years from voting 
on the grounds it unjustifiably infringed the right to vote guaranteed by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:68 
Denial of the right to vote to penitentiary inmates ... is more likely to 
erode respect for the rule of law than to enhance it, and more likely to 
undermine sentencing goals of deterrence and rehabilitation than to further 
them. . .. Denying prisoners the right to vote imposes negative costs on 
prisoners and on the penal system. It removes a route to social development 
and rehabilitation acknowledged since the time of Mill, and it undermines 
correctional law and policy directed towards rehabilitation and integration. 
As the trial judge clearly perceived, [the denial of the vote] "serves to 
further alienate prisoners from the community to which they must return, 
and in which their families live". (citations omitted) 
In contrast, the dissenting minority concluded that Canada's Parliament 
could justifiably exclude those persons guilty of relatively serious crimes 
from voting:69 
Permitting the exercise of the franchise by offenders incarcerated for 
serious offences undermines the rule oflaw and civic responsibility because 
such persons have demonstrated a great disrespect for the community in 
their committing serious crimes: such persons have attacked the stability 
and order within our community. Society therefore may choose to curtail 
temporarily the availability of the vote to serious criminals both to punish 
64 See Julian V Roberts "Sentencing Reform in New Zealand: An Analysis of the Sentenc-
ing Act 2002" (200,3) 36 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 249. 
65 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1)(a). 
66 Ibid, s 7(1)(e). 
67 Ibid, s 7(1 )(h). 
68 Sauve v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 SCR 519 at [58J- [59] 
per McLachlin CJ. 
69 Ibid, at [116] per Gonthier I. 
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those criminals and to insist that civic responsibility and respect for the 
rule of law, as goals worthy of pursuit, are prerequisites to democratic 
participation. 
While I personally share the views of the majority on the Canadian Supreme 
Court, it seems to me that the minority's position is not so manifestly 
mistaken or wrongheaded that it can be rejected out of hand. In other 
words, quite reasonable and well-meaning people genuinely will believe 
that losing the right to vote is an appropriate response to at least some sorts 
ofcrimes,1° and this is a view that deserves respect even from those who 
disagree with it. We might then argue further over how best to determine 
what crimes should attract the consequence of disenfranchisement: do the 
often arbitrary outcomes of a blanket rule disqualifying from voting all 
serving prisoners, or even all prisoners serving a sentence over a threshold 
period, fatally undermine this rule's basis? Ought this consequence instead 
be restricted only to offences that threaten the fundamental underpinnings 
or democratic character of New Zealand's constitutional order??] Or, should 
disenfranchisement as a consequence of criminal offending be imposed, 
as the European Court of Human, Rights has argued, "not by operation of 
a law but by the decision of a judge following judicial proceedings"?72 
However, as important as these arguments about the precise method of 
disenfranchisement are, the underlying issue - is censure or rehabilitation 
the appropriate re&ponse that society should adopt towards individuals who 
have engaged in criminal behaviour deserving of imprisonment? - is one 
that simply cannot be resolved in a universally acceptable, unarguably 
correct fashion. 
C Conclusion 
The decision by New Zealand's Parliament to strip the right to vote from 
all current prisoners will create a range of quite arbitrary outcomes, with 
some relatively minor offenders being completely disenfranchised while 
comparatively more serious offenders face no such penalty. These arbitrary 
outcomes make it virtually impossible to "demonstrably justify" the limit 
70 See, for example, Chris. Manfredi "In defense of prisoner disenfranchisement" in Alec 
C Ewald and Brandon Rottinghaus (eds), above n 53, at 259. 
71 That is, "corrupt practices" under the Electoral Act 1993, or offences such as treason, 
or corruption and bribery of a Minister of the Crown or Member of Parliament under 
the Crimes Act 1961, ss 102- 103. 
72 Frodl y Austria, above n 38, at [28]; citing Hirst y The United Kingdom (No 2), above 
n 34, at [77]- [78]. 
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on the right to vote, meaning the legislation likely is inconsistent with both 
the NZBORA and New Zealand's international human rights obligations. 
While this inconsistency does not affect the legal validity of a parliamen~ 
tarY enactment - prison officials, registrars of electors and the courts will 
all have to apply it as "the Law" - it does call into question the ' moral 
desirability of such a measure. Beyond the immediate issue of whether 
the particular provisions of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced 
Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 are defensible, the basic justification for 
preventing any criminal offender from voting also is questionable: It relies 
upon a contractarian model of the right to vote and particular views of the 
point and purpose of incarceration that are, if not inherently unreasonable 
or manifestly wrongheaded, deeply contentious. 
, Given that the law Parliament has chosen to make raises these quite 
fundamental substantive issues, we should expect to see certain explanations 
from those who voted to enact it. If a majority of Members of Parliament 
support legislation that appears to unjustifiably limit the right to vote even 
after being warned about this consequence, why did they nevertheless think 
it a good idea to do so? And if those Members believe that an individual's 
criminal offending is a sufficient basis for removing her or his right to vote, 
what is the basis for that belief and when does such offending reach the 
requisite level? We are, after all, talking about legislation that will remove a 
fundamental human right from some 2,700 peopleJ3 Insofar as fundamen-
tal human rights are matters to be taken seriously, or are seen as involving 
claims that go beyond those of everyday policy-making, then taking such 
a right from a group of individuals should be one of the most carefully 
considered and closely weighed decisions that a legislative body can take, 
IV Prohibiting all Prisoners from Voting: Procedural Problems 
New Zealand's Parliament faces almost no formal procedural constraints 
when deciding what rules will govern the nation's electoral processes. Aside 
from a few "entrenched" provisions that require a 75 per cent majority of 
MPs or referenda vote to change,14 any part of New Zealand's electoral law 
can be amended or repealed by an ordinary Act of Parliament without the 
risk of subsequent judicial invalidation. This formal legislative freedom is 
part of a wider commitment to parliamentary sovereignty that continues 
73 See Department of Corrections Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) 
Amendment Bill: Initial Briefingfor theLaw and Order Committee, above iJ. 2. ' 
74 Electoral Act 1993, s 268(1). For an account ofthis entrenchment provision; seeAndrew 
Geddis Electoral Law in New Zealand: Practice and Policy (LexisNexis New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2007) at 46-48. 
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to underpin the New Zealand constitutional order.75 Justice Fisher, giving 
judgment in the High Court in 1992, summarised this point in a way that 
remains pertinent some two decades later: 76 -
While most legal systems aspire to some form of internal logic in the sense 
that each rule is derived directly or indirectly ·from another, the authority of 
the legal system as a whole must obviously flow from some ulterior premise 
or premises. In this case the premises are simple: each Court will follow the 
rulings of a Court superior to it in the same curial hierarchy and all New 
Zealand Courts will recognise and act upon the Acts of their Parliament. 
Of course, even if this description of New Zealand's constitutional funda-
mentals generally is· accepted as factually accurate, it still may be asked 
why it is the case. What causes New Zealand's courts to accept Parliament's 
enacted text as representing "the Law", and is it desirable that they do so? 
Explaining why parliamentary sovereignty remains a foundational con-
cept of New Zealand's constitutional ordering requires a mix of historical 
narrative, cultural analysis and jurisprudential theorising. The historical 
account involves tracing the origins of parliamentary sovereignty to the 
turbulence of 17th-century United Kingdom society,77 following its passage 
to and development within the colony of New Zealand,78 and witnessing 
the defeat of efforts to replace it with a written constitution constraining the 
legislature's law~aking authority.79 That is to say, New Zealand inherited 
the basic concept of parliamentary sovereignty from its colonial motherland, 
developed its constitutional arrangements around it, and has not as yet given 
it Up.80 Understanding why it has not done so then requires some appreciation 
for how the concept meshes with New Zealanders' cultural traditions and 
self-understanding. As Matthew Palmer has noted:81 
75 Matthew SR Palmer "New Zealand Constitutional Culture" (2007) 22 NZULR 565 at 
582- 586. 
76 Berkett v Tauranga District Court [1992] 3 NZLR 206 (HC) at 211. 
77 Jeffrey Goldsworthy The Sovereignty o/Parliament: History and Philosophy (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1999). 
78 Peter C Oliver The Constitution o/Independence: The Development o/Constitutional 
Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2005) . 
. 79 Paul Rishworth and others The New Zealand Bill 0/ Rights (Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 2003) at 5-8; Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill 0/ 
Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis New Zealand, Wellington, 2005) at 25-3l. 
80 See Mark Prebble With Respect: Parliamentarians, officials, and judges too (Institute 
of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2010) at 11-32. 
81 Palmer, above n 75, at 586. See also John Smillie "Who Wants Juristocracy?" (2006) 
11 Otago LR 183. 
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Suspicion of judges' ability to frustrate the will ofa democratically elected 
government taps into a deep root in the New Zealand national constitutional 
culture. The egalitarian and apparently democratic ethic remains strong in 
New Zealand. 
Simply put, with the appropriate qualifications of "for the most part" and "in 
the general case", New Zealanders prefer to leave the final word on all the 
country's laws with MPs that they get to choose for themselves, rather than 
a judiciary that deliberately is insulated from direct majoritarian pressures. 
This ongoing preference runs somewhat counter to the notions of "legal 
constitutionalism"82 presently ascendant throughout most of the liberal-
democratic world.83 In particular, suggesting that even the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of individuals can be limited (or even abrogated entirely) by a 
majoritarian legislature, subject only to the most minimal forms of judicial 
oversight, is tantamount to constitutional heresy in most such jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, there are solid jurisprudential reasons for preferring such 
a state of affairs, as exemplified by Jeremy Waldron's invocation of ''the 
dignity of legislation". 84 At the risk of oversimplifying, Waldron argues that 
legislation emerging from elected legislative bodies is deserving of respect 
and obedience both by individual citizens and other societal institutions 
(including the courts) because the process through which it becomes law 
better refiects the basic right of every individual to participate in deciding 
how to resolve contested moral issues. Elected legislatures enjoy a procedural 
legitimacy when making law that the courts, which in the final analysis make 
decisions according to the moral views of a handful of selected ex-lawyers, 
do not. 
This defence of legislative supremacy rests, of course, on the premise 
that the nation's freely and fairly chosen representatives in Parliament 
actually engage with those contested moral issues, and that they debate what 
to do about them in a thorough and properly respectful manner. For example, 
if MPs were to legislate based on the flip of a coin or roll of the dice, then 
there would be no particular reason to ascribe any particular legitimacy to the 
outcome of that process. Consequently, Waldron explicitly concedes that if 
legislative behaviour fails to meet a certain minimal deliberative threshold, 
then the resulting enactments may not (but not necessarily do not) deserve 
the general respect of the citizenry and other social institutions (such as 
82 Adam Tomkins Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005) at 10-25. 
83 See Ran Hirschi Towards ]uristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2004). 
84 See Jeremy Waldron The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999). 
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the COurtS).85 Recently, Waldron actually has suggested that New Zealand's ' 
Parliament is falling short of this requisite standard when it legislates; or, 
to adopt his terminology, its behaviour when making law risks placing 
New Zealand outside those "core cases" in which his defence oflegislative 
supremacy applies.86 His point is that legislative haste and inattention not 
only risks producing laws that contain significant flaws in application, but 
it undermines the very basis for ascribing legitimacy to the outcome of the 
parliamentary lawmaking process. 
Unfortunately, the passage of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sen-
tenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 provides another example of 
New Zealand's Parliament failing in its basic legislative duty. Despite the 
importance of the proposal's subject matter - a fundamental human right of 
thousands of individuals - the debate it received was so perfunctory as to 
not really merit that description. Furthermore, the supporters of the measure 
failed to adequately provide reasons for the limit on prisoners' fundamental 
rights; eventually retreating to the claim "it's just what the public wants". 
Not only do these shortcomings in legislative process call into question the 
moral (albeit not the formal legal) status of the prohibition on prisoners 
voting, they undermine the very basis for the claim that Parliament ought to 
be the final lawmaking institution for society. 
A Problems with the Bill s enactment into law 
Following its introduction and first reading; the Electoral (Disqualification 
of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bi1120 1 0 was sent to select committee 
for further scrutiny. The select committee stage of New Zealand's legislative 
process is the point at which Members of Parliament are meant to give a Bill 
its closest consideration and most detailed analysis. Almost every Bill that 
passes its first reading automatically receives some form of select committee 
scrutiny,87 with this process usually also incorporating the opportunity for the 
85 Jeremy Waldron "Th~ Core of the Case Against Judicial Review" (2006) 115 Yale LJ 
1346 at 1361- 1363 and 1401- 1406. 
86 Jeremy Waldron "Compared to what? Judicial activism and New Zealand's Parliament" 
[2005] NZLJ 441; Jeremy Waldron Parliamentary Recklessness: Why we need to 
legislate more carefolly (Maxim Institute, Auckland, 2008). For a similar argument 
regarding Parliament's passage of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, see Claire 
Charters "Responding to Waldron's Defence of Legislatures: Why New Zealand's 
Parliament Does Not Protect Rights in Hard Cases" [2006] NZ L Rev 621. 
87 That is, unless the House agrees to progress a Bill straight to its second reading stage 
under urgency: Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2008, SO 280{l). 
Furthermore, appropriation Bills or imprest supply Bills do not receive select committee 
scrutiny as a matter of course. 
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public to make submissions in both written and oral form. After reviewing 
these submissions, committee members then deliberate on the proposed 
legislation before reporting back to the House with their recommendation as 
to whether it should progress, along with any suggested amendments to its 
content. Such recommendations may be unanimous or by a majority, with 
the committee's minority members almost always able to write a dissenting 
report on the matter. Consequently, the select committee stage is extremely 
important in terms of allowing the public direct input into the lawmaking 
process, scrutinising the rationale for the proposed legislation and ensuring 
that this proposal will properly achieve that policy goal. 
However, the select committee process for the Electoral (Disqualification 
of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill 2010 was faulty from the 
beginning. Rather than send the proposal to the House's standing Justice 
and Electoral Committee, which usually considers matters relating to New 
Zealand's electoral law, or to the specially constituted Electoral Legisla-
tion Committee,88 the Government chose to send it to the Law and Order 
Committee.89 Not only do the Members of Parliament on this Committee 
have no prior experience with matters of electoral law, but the officials who 
advise it are drawn from the Department of Corrections, rather than the 
Ministry of Justice responsible for administering the Electoral Act 1993. 
Furthermore, the Chair of the Committee, the National Party's Sandra 
Goudie, refused a request by opposition MPs to allow Ministry of Justice 
officials to appear before the Committee and provide advice on the BilJ.9° 
The net result is that the Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) 
Amendment Bill 2010 received its close and detailed scrutiny from .a set of 
88 The House established this special purpose, aU-party select committee in' 2010 
to consider legislation relating to campaign financing and the 20ll referendum on 
the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system. However, its terms of reference 
simply state that it is to "examine legislation referred to it and report back to the House 
with its recommendations on them": New Zealand Parliament "Electoral Legislation 
Committee" (2010) <www.parliament.nz>. Consequently, there is no formal reason it 
could not also have considered the Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) 
Amendment Bill 2010. 
89 Technically, it is the House that determines which of its committees will consider any 
given Bill. However, the Government's numbers in the chamber mean that in practice 
the government gets to make this calL Exactly why it chose to send Mr Quinn's Bill to 
the Law and Order Committee is unclear; my personal view is that it did so for purely 
political reasons. That is, it ·believed that the Committee's mernbers ~ especially the 
Government members ~ would be more sympathetic to the Bill's purposes, while 
excluding officials from the Ministry of Justice from having any advisory role would 
lessen the critical scrutiny it received. 
90 See Derek Cheng "Upset MPs stage walkout" The New ZealaniHerald (New Zealand, 
1 July 2010) <www.nzherald.co.nz>. 
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paraliamentarians who were not particularly au Jait with the issues it raised 
and who received information about the proposal from officials with no 
day-to-dayexperience of the particular area of law. 
The Law and Order Coinmittee's report back to the House then exacer-
bated these initial problerns.91 For one thing, the majority (made up offive 
National and ACT Party members) recommended that the Bill progress 
in spite of receiving 51 public submissions opposing the law change and 
only two favouring it.92 Amongst those who opposed the move were the 
New Zealand Law Society93 and the Government's own Human Rights 
Commission.94 However, even after hearing this trenchant criticism of the 
Bill's fundamental purpose and in the face of the Attorney-General's s 7 
notice proclaiming the proposal inconsistent with the NZBORA, the majority 
report provided no reasons whatsoever for why it believed the Bill's content 
was justifiable. It merely recommended passage after changing the Bill's title 
to the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill 
and amending the wording of the provision that disqualifies prisoners from 
emolling to vote whilst incarcerated. Commentary on the justifications for 
the underlying policy was left to the Committee's Labour and Green Party 
members, who penned minority reports opposing the Bill's progress and 
listing the various Ways in which it falls short of human rights norms in both 
domestic and international law. 
91 Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill 20 10 (117-2) (select 
committee report). 
92 One of these supportive submissions was from the Bill's sponsor, Paul Quinn. 
93 New Zealand Law Society "Submission to the Law and Order Committee on the Electoral 
(Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bi1l20 1 0" at [18J concluded that 
the Bill: 
. .. is retrograde legislation, which will erode the free and democratic nature 
of New Zealand society witho~t justification. It is irrational and arbitrary and 
unreasonably impairs the right to vote more than is necessary. It is also not in due 
proportion to the objective of punishment. 
94 Human Rights Commission "Submission to the Law and Order Committee on the 
Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill 2010" at [7.4] 
opposed the Bill on the grounds that: 
Voting is a fundamental human right and [removing itl cannot be justified either 
as punishment or as a deterrent. The Bill itself is inconsistent with New Zealand's 
international commitments and overseas jurisprudence. In the domestic context 
it contravenes the [New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990] and cannot be justified 
and the disproportionate impact on Maori amounts to indirect discrimination. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, it undermines the notion of New Zealand as 
a democracy where everyone has rights and responsibilities. 
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Not only did the majority's report completely fail to address the need for 
.any change to the law, its proposed amendments to the Bill contained a glaring 
error. The majority recommended that the Bill be changed to completely 
repeal the existing s 80(1)(d) that disqualifies prisoners serving sentences of 
three or more years from enrolling to vote, replacing this with a provision 
disqualifying "a person who is detained in a prison pursuant to a sentence 
of imprisonment imposed after the commencement of [this legislation]".95 
While this change was intended to avoid retrospectively disqualifying current 
prisoners serving sentences of less than three years from registering to vote, 
the Committee neglected to include a transitional provision that continues 
to disqualify existing prisoners serving sentences of more than three years. 
Consequently, enacting the Committee's recommended amendment would 
have allowed any current prisoner to enrol to vote no matter how serious 
the nature of his or her offence or term of imprisonment, whilst preventing 
all future prisoners from enrolling to vote. 
Although this potential outcome clearly was an inadvertent mistake,96 
one that was remedied later in the legislative process by way of a Supplemen-
tary Order Paper, the fact that it happened at all was not only politically 
embarrassing97 but also indicative of a lack of legislative care on this issue. 
This casual attitude then continued to be exhibited in subsequent stages of 
the renamed Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment 
Bill's passage into law. At the Bill's second reading following the Law and 
Order Committee's report, the only Government ill to give a substantive 
speech in favour of its passage was its sponsor, Paul Quinn. The Chair of the 
Law and Order Committee did not even attend the debate on its report, while 
her party colleagues gave only one- or two-sentence "speeches" to the House 
in support of its recommendations.98 The reason for the Government ills 
minimal contributions was that they wished to speed through the "debate" 
on the measure, so as to leave sufficient time to complete the second reading 
of another Member's Bill that same evening. 
A similar failure to engage in debate was displayed at the Bill's committee 
stage. At this point in the legislative process, MPs have the opportunity to 
95 Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill 20 1 0 (117-2), cl4. 
96 The Bill's sponsor, Paul Quinn, claimed that the error was thefawt of the parliamentary 
counsel who drafted the amendment: see (20 October 20 I 0) 667 NZPD 14679. However, 
it should be noted that parliamentary counsel wOJ:k to drafting instructions provided by 
the Committee. 
97 The Committee's error received a large amount of media covemge: see, for example, 
Yvonne Tahana " 'Stupid' legislation gives killers and rapists the right to vote" The New 
Zealand Herald (New Zealand, 21 September 2010) <www.nzherald.co.nz>; Radio 
New Zealand News "Snag over bill to stop prisoners voting" (2010) Radio New Zealand 
<www.radionz.co.nz>. 
98 (20 October 2010) 667 NZPD 14679. 
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examine a Bill in detail and debate the wording and effects of particular 
provisions. However, of the 13 speakers who addressed the Bill's content, 
only three came from the ranks of the National Party. The ACT Party, which 
provided the National Party with the votes needed for a parliamentary 
majority throughout this legislation's passage, did not even put up a single 
MP to address the Bill's content. Furthermore, during this debate Mr Quinn 
made a rather startling admission about his own legislation:99 
[An opposition Labour Party MP] proceeded to go on to ask what the 
mischief was behind the. bill. Well, there is no mischief; this legislation is 
what the overwhelming majority of people want. ... The overwhelming 
majority of the community want prisoners not to be able to vote. 
We may put to one side the question of why, if the community really is so 
strongly opposed to prisoners voting, only one person besides Mr Quinn 
made a submission to select committee in support of his legislation. The real 
question instead is whether it is appropriate for an MPto propose legislation 
that removes the fundamental rights of individuals for no other reason than 
that it "is what the overwhelming majority of people want". Or, rather, is 
it appropriate that an MP do so without being able to cogently explain and 
defend why "the people" are right to desire this course of action? 
The Bill's final, third reading debate was only slightly better. Although 
more National Mps did contribute to the debate - five in total, including 
the Minister of Defence; the sole Government minister to speak during the 
Bill's entire passage - none spoke for more than three or four minutes. Mr 
Quinn opened the debate with a somewhat Freudian slip: "I have listened 
with care and intent to the arguments - or should I say the lack of arguments 
- that have been discussed in this House. "100 Furthermore, the ACT Party's 
Hilary Calvert gave the following speech setting out her party's "reasons" 
for supporting the measure's passage into law: 'o, 
I rise to take a call on the third reading of the Electoral (Disqualification 
of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill. I cannot pretend this bill is my 
favourite thing. [Labour MP] Trevor Mallard leaving the House earlier, and 
not being.able to vote while he was away, could count as a favourite thing. 
Perhaps popping a ping-pong ball in the mouthofthe honourable member 
over there who all day keeps turning his head from side to side with his 
mouth open could count as my favourite thing. This bill is not my favourite 
thing. However, Act is supporting National on this bill. 
99 (10 November 2010)668 NZPD 15194 (emphasis added). 
100 (8 December 2010) 669 NZPD 15961. 
101 (8 December 2010) 669 NZPD 15969. 
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When assessing this last contribution, it should be remembered that while 
her party's five votes provided the parliamentary majority necessary to pass 
the measure into law, none of its members had given a substantive speech 
explaining the reasons for their support since the first reading debate .. 
The point of recounting in such detail the process by which this Bill was 
enacted is to highlight how badly Parliament failed in its lawmaking duty. I 
do not mean to overstate matters here. The test of parliamentary processes 
when making law ought not to be perfection, but rather "good enough". After 
all, not every parliamentarian can rise to the oratory heights of Cicero, or 
will carefully frame her or his debate contributions to meet the Rawlsian 
"how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court 
opinion?" test of public reason. 102 If we seek to hold Members of Parliament 
to such standards, then it is unlikely any debate on any measure will ever 
suffice to meet them.103 Nevertheless,< where Members of Parliament are 
considering a legislative proposal that affects a fundamental individual right 
~ especially where it affects that right in a way that they have been advised 
cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society - we 
should expect that at a minimum they will engage meaningfully With the 
issues at hand and take the opportunity to make a genuine effort at spelling 
out why the mea.sure is nevertheless the right one to adopt into law. We 
certainly should not expect them to speed through the legislative process in 
order to get on to the next item of business, or to effectively refuse to take 
part in the debate at all. Because insofar as they do so, they undermine the 
reason for respecting their legislative judgements, which ultimately saps 
legitimacy from Parliament's claim to be the sovereign lawmaking body 
for society as a whole. 
B Wider problems with how Parliament legislates 
If the passage of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) 
Amendment Act 2010 into law was an isolated incident that represents an 
unfortunate, but singular, lapse in legislative standards, then that would 
be one thing. However, Parliament's recent treatment of other cases 
involving matters of fundamental individual rights indicates that there are 
102 John Rawls Political Liberalism (expanded ed, Columbia University Press, New York, 
2005) at 254. 
103 But equally, it is unlikely any other institution in society would be able to meet such a 
strict standard. Even courts on occasion issue poorly reasoned, incompletely argued and 
somewhat superficial judgments - which nevertheless remain binding on the parties to 
the proceedings and lower courts in the judicial hierarchy. 
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more widespread and systemic problems with respectto.how Parliament is 
approaching its lawmaking duties. 
An initial matter of note is the sheer regularity with which Members 
of Parliament vote to enact legislation to which the Attorney-General has 
attached a s 7 notice under the NZBORA. In a recent speech, the Minister of 
Justice observed that this has occurred on 20 occasions since 1990,104 or on 
average once a year. What he failed to record was that the rate at which such 
s 7 notices have been issued has increased substantially since 2000. Of the 
28 government Bills to receive s 7 notices since the NZBORA's enactment, 
23 have been introduced into the House in the past decade. Of those 23 
Bills, six sit before the House as of the time of writing, while 15 have 
been enacted with the apparently NZBORA inconsistent provisions intact. 
It may be, of course, that in recent years successive Attorney-Generals have 
become more assiduous in issuing s 7 reports with respect to Government 
Bills, hence skewing the data. However, the fact remains that Members 
of Parliament are expressly being told with increasing frequency that the 
legislation before them unjustifiably limits fundamental individual rights, 
yet still are proceeding to vote it into law. 
Elected parliamentarians taking a different view to the Attorney-General 
about the justifiability of a particular legislative proposal does not in and of 
itself represent a failure of process. Reasonable people can and do disagree 
over whether a given limit on some right is "demonstrably justified"; 
witness the existence of split judicial decisions on such matters. 105 The 
Attorney-General's opinion on the justifiability of any given rights limit is 
based on advice from officials, which in turn reflects their analysis of what 
relevant court decisions on the issue have said. So it hardly is surprising 
that there will sometimes, perhaps even reasonably often, be a difference 
between the views of Members of Parliament and the Attorney-General's 
judicially informed opinion as to the justifiability of any given limit on 
individual rights. Where such disagreement occurs, New Zealand's strong 
104 Simon Power, Minister of Justice "Speech to Bill of Rights Act Symposium" (Wellington, 
11 November 201 0) <www.beehive.govt.nz>. I have provided a slightly highernumbet of 
24 enactments passed over a s 7 notice at Andrew Geddis "The Comparative Irrelevance 
of the NZBORA to Legislative Practice" (2009) 23 NZULR 465 at 477 ["Legislative 
Practice"]' The difference in numbers may be due to differing judgements as to whether 
Parliament has adequately amended particular Bills to remove the identified rights 
inconsistency. 
105 See, for example, part lIIB above "Is prisoner disenfranchisement ever justified?" 
for a discussion of the Canadian Supreme Court's five- four split in Sauve v Canada 
(Chief Electoral Officer), above n 68. In the New Zealand context, the Supreme Court 
has divided three-two over the justifiability of particular limits on individual rights in 
Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91 and Siemer v Solicitor-General 
[2010] NZSC 54, [2010] 3 NZLR 767. 
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commitment to parliamentary sovereignty dictates that the majority of 
elected representatives' view of the matter will prevail - a state of affairs 
that is expressly provided for through s 4 of the NZBORA. So the fact 
that Members of Parliament choose to enact legislation in spite of, or over 
the top of, the Attorney-General's opinion as to its consistency with the 
NZBORA is part and parcel of a constitutional system that leaves the last 
word with those individuals directly elected by the nation's populace. Insofar 
as there are sound reasons for maintaining such a decision-making system, 
Parliament's decision to legislate in the face of s 7 notices is an inevitable 
and not necessarily undesirable outcome. 
Having said that, the fact that Parliament almost always votes to enact 
measures l06 that the Attorney-General has advised are inconsistent with 
fundamental individual rights raises questions about how seriously its 
members view such advice. Furthermore, if parliamentarians do not give any 
evidence that they are confronting, considering but ultimately rejecting that 
advice because they find alternative arguments to be more convincing, then 
they hardly can be said to be responding to it at all. Simply put, if Members 
of Parliament just ignore what the Attorney-Generalis saying instead of 
answering his claims with reasons of their own, they are failing to fulfil their 
proper function under the NZBORA. That legislation is intended to create a 
form of dialogue over matters of individual rights between parliamentarians 
and the COurtS,107 with the Attorney-General's report serving as a conduit 
between these two branches of government. While the members of the 
elected branch still get the final say in the debate, the background assumption 
is that they will only reach their final judgement after seriously considering 
what the Attorney-General tells them the courts likely would think about 
the proposed rights limit. 
Unfortunately, such serious consideration is not always evident during 
parliamentary debates on legislation where NZBORA consistency is at issue. 
Two examples serve to illustrate this point. First, on two recent occasions 
Parliament has acted to add new substances to the Misuse of Drugs Act 
1975 in the face of s 7 notices. lOS The Attorney-General's advice on these 
106 At least, measures that come before the House in the form of a government Bill. Some 
90 per cent of such Bills attracting a s 7 notice have been enacted with the apparently 
inconsistent provision intact: see Geddis "Legislative Practice", above n 104, at 477. 
107 Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our Political System 
(John McIndoe, Dunedin, 1992) at 59; Rishworth and others, above n 79, at 199-20l. 
See generally Sara Jackson "Designing Human Rights Legislation: 'Dialogue" the 
Commonwealth Model and the Roles of Parliaments and Courts" (2007) 13 Auckland 
ULRev 89. 
108 Misuse of Drugs (Classification of BZP) Amendment Act 2008; Misuse of Drugs 
Amendment Bi112010 (126-2). 
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proposals reflects the Supreme Court's finding in R v Hansen t09 that a 
"reverse onus" provision in the Misuse of Dmgs Act 1975,lIO requiring 
persons possessing over a threshold amount of a classified substance to 
"prove" they do not intend to supply it to others, unjustifiably limits the 
accused's right to the presumption of innocence. I II However, rather than 
independently assess this claim for themselves, Members of Parliament were 
content to accept a ministerial assurance that it is important to classify the 
new substances under the Misuse of Dmgs Act 1975 (and hence bring them 
under its reverse onus provision), while leaving consideration ofNZBORA 
issues to a future Law Commission report. 112 The Select Committee report 
on the latest amendment legislation does not even mention the NZBORA, 
instead once again echoing the executive's claim that the need for urgent 
action justifies the reclassification of the substance at issue, 113 
There is, of course, something to be said for parliamentarians deferring . 
to the Minister's judgement as to whether a particular dmg ought to be 
proscribed, given the Minister's access to the advice of experts in the effects 
of the relevant substances. Equally, the field of dmg policy is a complex one, 
so there is some wisdom in Members of Parliament seeking guidance on 
how best to stmcture the law in this area. The criticism is'not, therefore, that 
parliamentarians should not look to advice from outside Parliament when 
considering how to respond to a particular rights issue. However, in respect 
to this issue, parliamentarians made no effort whatsoever to engage in an 
independent assessinent ·of the rights issues involved. They instead simply 
rubber-stamped the relevant minister's view that the need for quick action 
tmmped all other concerns, while deferring to some future date the question 
of the rights of those accused of supplying the newly classified substance. 
This failure, it seems to me, represents an inexcusably complete abdication 
of responsibility for the rights consequences of their decision. 
The second example is even more troubling. It involves the Parole 
(Extended Supervision Orders) Amendment Act 2009, which was introduced, 
debated and passed into law by the House in but a single day. This amendment 
legislation dealt with a law permitting "extended supervision orders" to 
be imposed on certain offenders convicted of serious sexual offending, 
effectively subjecting them to a system of intensive monitoring and control 
for up to 10 years after their term of imprisonment ends. The Government 
informed the House that the amendment legislation was intended to fix 
109 R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007) 3 NZLR 1. 
110 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 6(6). 
111 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(c). 
112 Misuse of Drugs (Classification ofBZP) Amendment Bill 2007 (146-1 ) (select committee 
report) at 6-c-7 . 
113 Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill 2010 (126-2) (select committee report). 
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an inadvertent and purely technical flaw in the legal regime, and on that 
. basis the House gave its unanimous consent to suspend Standing Orders 
and expedite its passage into law. However, after that consent had been 
given, the Attorney-General tabled a s 7 notice advising the House of his 
opinion that the proposed legislation actually created a new control power 
over offenders which unjustifiably limits their rights against retrospective 
penalties and double jeopardy; 114 and the right not to be arbitrarily detained.1l5 
As parliamentarians only were informed of this fact literally moments before 
they began to debate the measure, and because they already had agreed not to 
send the proposal to select committee for scrutiny, they had no opportunity 
at all to test the Attorney-General's claims before the Bill's enactment.116 
Of course, the main blame for this episode lies with the executive; in 
particular, the lack of communication between the Attorney-General and the 
Minister of Justice who introduced the legislation. However, irrespective 
of who is responsible for the House being misled on this matter, the conse-
quence remains the same. As Claudia Geiringer noted at the time:ll7 
What I am absolutely horrified to see ... is legislation being enacted 
following a section 7 report without being sent to a select committee at all, 
indeed, without even sitting on the order paper for three days so that MPs 
can read it and digest theAG's report. 
Furthermore, the response of parliamentarians to this issue was virtually 
complete silence. Only one MPraised any sort of complaint about the process 
at the time of the Bill's passage,us while the matter was not subsequently 
raised in the House. Again, one would like to think parliamentarians 
would be more concerned about the fact that they had passed a law that 
114 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 26. 
lIS Ibid, s 22. 
116 In fact, the only mention of the Attorney-General 's s 7 notice during debate was by Keith 
Locke, who noted, at (2 April 2009) 653 NZPD 2381: 
As there were only two speakers before I started speaking, I have not even finished 
reading properly the Attorney-General's assessment of the bill in relation to the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. I think the Green Party will have to cast an 
abstention, because we have not been given the full information to be able to 
cousider, on behalf of the New Zealand public, exactly which course we should 
take. 
117 Claudia Geiringer"Urgency, Parliament and the Bill of Rights - time for a cup of 
tea, guys?" (2009) 15 Lambton Quay <http://15Iambtonquay.blogspot.com> (blog 
discontinued, but copy on file with author). 
118 See above, n 116. 
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may unjustifiably trench on individual rights without properly having been 
informed of that fact. 
In highlighting these two examples, I do not mean to imply that New 
Zealand's parliamentarians never pay proper attention to NZBORA issues. 
Not only are they quite capable of doing so in theory, there are numerous 
examples of them doing so in practice. The picture I wish to convey instead 
is a mixed one. On occasion Members of Parliament will closely scrutinise 
issues of individual rights and the justifications for any proposed limits on 
these; see the recent select committee report on the Search and Surveillance 
Bill 2009,1l9 or the debates in the House over the Civil Union Act 2004 
that gave legal recognition to same-sex partnerships.120 Unfortunately, on 
other occasions Members of Parliament have failed to do so, either in part 
or completely. The passage of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced 
Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 represents one such failure. However, it is 
not the only time that parliamentarians have neglected their legislative duty 
in this regard; they do so on a regrettably frequent basis. 
V Conclusion: Preserving Parliament's Claim to Sovereignty 
New Zealand's constitution continues to afford the nation's Parliament 
almost complete legislative freedom on all matters, including those 
involving fundamental individual rights. The justification for doing so, in 
the final analysis, boils down to that institution's greater claim to democratic 
legitimacy. The wide range of reasonable views as to what constitutes 
''the right answer" for any contested substantive matter, including matters 
involving individual rights, means that the least-worst solution is to allow 
the majority of representatives freely chosen by the general public to make 
that decision. These decision-makers not only are alive to the viewpoints of 
their constituents, but they may be held directly accountable for the choices 
that they make. Consequently, their preferred solutions remain contestable 
and can be reviewed and replaced at any future point in time by a new 
majority. This always provisional nature of parliamentary enactments means 
that debate over what is the "right answer" need not end and affords every 
individual the continuing opportunity to take part in deciding what that 
answer is; at least, as best as can be achieved in a community of some four 
million individuals. 
However, any defence of Parliament's supreme lawmaking status must 
incorporate not only an account of how its members are chosen via the 
election process, but also some standard of "proper" decision-making by 
119 Search and Surveillance Bill 2009 (45-2) (select committee report). 
120 (2 December 2004) 622 NZPD 17386. 
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thAt institution. To reiterate, that standard should be one of "good enough", 
not perfection. There also will be a measure of disagreement about just what 
constitutes a "good enough" process oflegislating. Different views will be 
held on issues such as should Members of Parliament be bound by the views 
of their constituents or exercise independent judgement on a given issue;121 
when is the House justified in moving into urgency to consider and enact 
some measure; ought Members be required to be physically present in the 
debating chamber in order to vote on some particular matter; 122 and the like. 
However, any standard of proper decision-making must at the least require 
those engaged in the legislative process to actually acknowledge the issues 
before them, genuinely consider what is the best solution to those issues and 
explain why they are of that opinion. This especially is true when the issue 
before the House of Representatives is one that impacts directly upon the 
fundamental individual rights that underpin a free and democratic society. 
Unfortunately, the majority of New Zealand's Members of Parliament failed 
to meet this minimal standard when enacting the Electoral (Disqualification 
of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010, just as they have on other 
legislative occasions. 
At this point one might be tempted to take refuge in the cynical obser-
vation that: "Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as 
we know how they are made."123 However, the consequences of such a loss 
of respect are somewhat different in each case. If members of society no 
longer trust the way smallgoods are manufactured, they simply can stop 
eating sausages. 124 That luxury of consumer choice is not available when it 
comes to the output of parliamentary processes. For so long as Parliament 
remains sovereign, its enactments continue to be universally binding and 
enforceable irrespective of how well or poorly they are made. 125 The question 
121 Andrew Geddis "Proportional Representation, 'Party Hopping' and the Limits of 
Electoral Regulation: A Cautionary Tale from New Zealand" (2006) 35 Common Law 
World Review 24 at 27- 29. 
122 Something that is not required in the New Zealand Parliament. Under the Standing 
Orders of the House of Representatives 2008, the party whip may cast a Member's vote 
provided that Member is within the parliamentary precincts or is absent on parliamentary 
business. 
123 Commonly attributed to Otto von Bismarck. the observation actually was made in 1869 
by the American lawyer-poet John Godfrey Saxe. 
124 Alternatively, they might create an oversight body to ensure the quality of manufacture, 
such as the New Zealand Food Safety Authority. 
125 See, for example, the judiciary'S refusal to examine the legislative process in British 
Railways Board v Picldn [1974] AC 765 (HL); Te Runanga 0 Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v 
Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA) at 307- 308; Regina (Jackson) v Attorney 
General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262; Boscawen v Attorney-General (No 2) 
[2008) NZCA 12, [2009) 2 NZLR 229. 
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then becomes, should Parliament retain that status if it consistently fails to 
follow proper processes when making law? Or, rather, as Waldron has asked: 
"does Parliament take its legislative responsibilities seriously enough to 
make it inappropriate for Judges to undertake the sort of close scrutiny of 
statutes that gets attacked as 'judicial activism'''?126 
I am not claiming here that matters have gotten so bad in New Zealand 
that the only solution is for the courts to step in to replace an irredeemably 
fallen institution. Nor do I want matters to get that bad: my preference 
is that Parliament should retain its role as supreme lawmaker for New 
Zealand as a nation. However, unless Parliament improves its lawmaking 
behaviour, its role increasingly will be open to challenge on the basis that 
it is not to be trusted with important decisions about individual rights. 
And it becomes increasingly difficult for those of us who are in favour of 
parliamentary sovereignty to defend its retention as a foundational principle 
of New Zealand's constitutional order when measures like the Electoral 
(Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 become 
the law of the land in the manner that they do. So this article ends with a 
plea to New Zealand's parliamentarians. Whether by adopting new internal 
institutional procedures where rights issues are involved; 127 strengthening the 
scrutiny mechanisms contained within the NZBORA itself,1 28 or at the very 
least simply taking rights seriously, please do your job properly. 
126 Waldron "Compared to what? Judicial activism and New Zealand's Parliament", above 
n 86, at 443, 
127 Such as the United Kingdom's Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on Human Rights: 
see Anthony Lester "The Magnetism of the Human 199hts Act 1998" (2002) 33 VUWLR 
477 at 499-503. 
128 As the Green Party's Keith Locke has proposed in a Member's Bill: see Keith Locke 
"New Zealand Bill of Rights Amendment Bill" (2010) Green Party of Aotearoa New 
Zealand <www.greens.org.nz>. 
